The Risk of Harm Standard

In a handful of states, including Minnesota, Montana, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania, courts have used a different legal standard to decide cases where religion and custody collide. In these courts, a parent seeking to curtail the other parent's religious activities need not demonstrate actual or substantial harm to the child, but only that there is a risk that the child might be harmed in the future.

In MacLagan v. Klein, 123 N.C. App. 557, 473 S.E. 2d 778 (1996), a North Carolina court ruled that, since a young girl had identified as Jewish since age three, exposure to the Methodist religion might interfere with her Jewish identity and adversely affect her emotional well-being. Based on its concern that the girl might suffer harm in the future, the court gave the Jewish father sole control over the child's religious education.

The No Harm Required Standard

In a few states, including Arkansas and Wisconsin, courts do not apply the actual or substantial harm standard or the risk of harm standard. Instead, these courts use a simple rule: The parent with sole legal custody has exclusive control over the child's religious education. If a dispute arises over religious upbringing, the court will curtail the noncustodial parent's religious activities and enforce the custodial parent's desires. These courts reason that interfering with the noncustodial parent's religious activities does not violate First Amendment rights, because the restrictions apply only to the time period in which the parent is with the children. At all other times, the parent is free to practice his or her religion as he or she chooses.

When parents have joint legal custody (which a majority of states now award unless it would harm the child), teachings from both religions may be allowed.

Johns v. Johns: Father forced to bring children to church during visitation

In Johns v. Johns, 53 Ark. App. 90, 918 S.W. 2d 728 (1996), an Arkansas court deferred to the custodial parent's wishes. In this case, the father complained that the mother, who had legal and physical custody of the children, was preventing him from visiting with his kids. The mother said she was refusing visits because he didn't take the kids to church and Sunday school. The trial court ordered Mr. Johns to bring the kids to church. The father appealed. The appellate court agreed with the trial court, holding that because the mother was the custodial parent, her desire that the kids attend church each week was paramount.

Zummo v. Zummo: Joint legal custody equals two religions

In Zummo v. Zummo, 394 Pa. Super. 30, 574 A.2d 1130 (1990), the divorcing couple's dispute about the religious upbringing of their children was resolved by ordering the father to take the children to Jewish services (the mother's religion) and also allowing him to bring the children to Catholic services (his religion). The court believed that, because the couple shared joint legal custody, they each had the right to instill religious beliefs in their kids.

Parenting Agreements Regarding Children and Religion

When deciding a dispute about religious upbringing, courts might consider any oral or written parenting agreements that the couple previously made about how to handle the children's religious upbringing. However, if you haven't been able to stick to the agreement yourselves, a court won't necessarily enforce it for you. In fact, most courts reject agreements about which religion the children will follow when their folks separate. Here are the reasons they commonly use.

The agreement is vague. Often, couples make such agreements informally, prior to marriage, without considering a future divorce or separation. As a result, the agreements are vague. For example, many agreements fail to specify the degree of religious training (how often the child will attend services or whether the child will attend additional classes, Bible studies, and other church-affiliated programs) or whether the children will be permitted to attend the other parent's place of worship during special events.

This agreement is oral.